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and a body of traditional practices generally referred to as the English
Constitution. The issue Paine raises is whether in addition to being
traditional, the constitution is rational, that is to say, whether this set of
documents and practices expresses a consistent and equitable set of
political principles. Burke could avoid much of the force of Paine s
question because Burke appealed to experience and tradition instead of
to reason and philosophy in his defense of the English Constitution. But
Coleridge cannot disown reason and philosophy. Church and State is after
all a philosophical account of the English Constitution. It is thus within
the context of trying to defend the ancient constitution against the
attacks Paine makes on its rationality, charges that Coleridge as an
advocate of philosophy has to take seriously, that Coleridge enunciates
his aesthetic statism. Coleridge seeks to reconcile the national political
traditions embodied in the English Constitution with the universality of
reason by positing a symbolic logic for this constitution.
Let us now turn to the speci cs of Paine s attack on the English
Constitution. The question of the relationship between theory, political
principles, and a written constitution had been brought to prominence
by Paine s charge in Rights of Man ( ) that the English government
had no constitution:
The aesthetic politics of Coleridge
A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but a
real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in visible form, there is
none . . . Can then Mr. Burke produce the English Constitution? If he cannot,
we may fairly conclude, that though it has been so much talked about, no such
thing as a constitution exists, or ever did exist, and consequently that the people
have yet a constitution to form.
For Paine, the French Revolution represented an advancement in
government in large part because its leaders had brought forth their
principles in a written form:
In contemplating the French constitution, we see in it a rational order of things.
The principles harmonize with the forms, and both with their origin. It may
perhaps be said as an excuse for bad forms, that they are nothing more than
forms; but this is a mistake. Forms grow out of principles, and operate to
continue the principles they grow from. It is impossible to practise a bad form
on anything but a bad principle. It cannot be ingrafted on a good one; and
wherever the forms in any government are bad, it is a certain indication that the
principles are bad also. Rights of Man,
As can be seen, Paine begins by asserting that the French constitution is
a rational order of things, and this indicates why an existing, nite,
visible, written form is required. Because Paine is very much a certain
kind of eighteenth-century thinker, he identi es rationality with a set of
rst principles which are clearly expressed and transparently inter-
preted. In the political application of reason, such a body of rst
principles is a written constitution.
When Paine states that the principles harmonize with the forms, he
sets up an important distinction between principles and forms. Of
these two terms, let us rst consider what Paine means by forms.
Elsewhere, in describing the in uence of the American Revolution in
making the French Revolution possible, Paine makes an analogy be-
tween the forms of the constitution and the forms of language: The
American constitutions were to liberty, what a grammar is to language:
they de ne its parts of speech, and practically construct them into
syntax (Rights of Man, ). Paine s remark that the American constitu-
tion is to liberty as grammar is to language makes it clear that the
forms are rst principles expressed in language, which, when applied to
political ends, yield the structure called the constitution.
In contrast, principles on their own, unembodied in language, are
intangible, having an ideal rather than real existence. In making
this distinction, Paine is operating with the usual eighteenth-century
theory of language, most famously adumbrated by Locke, which distin-
Romanticism, aesthetics, and nationalism
guishes between ideas in the mind and their expression in the marks and
sounds of language. Such a distinction carries with it the danger that the
connection between ideas and language, necessary for proper knowing
and doing, can be lost. And indeed much of this passage from Paine
plays out that anxiety. The importance of the harmony and inseparabil-
ity of forms and principles is insisted on repeatedly.
For Paine, it is the written constitution that takes on this cementing
role: it preserves the principles by binding them to written forms. And,
indeed, by the end of the passage, the ambiguity of the word forms
( whenever the forms in any government are bad ) makes it seem
that not only the written constitution is meant, but also all those
material manifestations of its enactment (the assembly, the law courts,
the army) as well. This seems to guarantee that the written document
will overcome any of the possible dangers that might slip in through
the gap between the idea and its representation, that is, between politi-
cal principles and their forms. Thus Paine believes that the only way to
ensure that a government is based on good principles is to base
them on reason and to insure those principles by setting them down in
a written form. From the written form of the constitution, the other
forms of government, its material institutions, will follow and be
safeguarded.
Because Paine considered the traditional political institutions of
Europe inequitable and thus irrational, he feared that, without the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl aikidobyd.xlx.pl
and a body of traditional practices generally referred to as the English
Constitution. The issue Paine raises is whether in addition to being
traditional, the constitution is rational, that is to say, whether this set of
documents and practices expresses a consistent and equitable set of
political principles. Burke could avoid much of the force of Paine s
question because Burke appealed to experience and tradition instead of
to reason and philosophy in his defense of the English Constitution. But
Coleridge cannot disown reason and philosophy. Church and State is after
all a philosophical account of the English Constitution. It is thus within
the context of trying to defend the ancient constitution against the
attacks Paine makes on its rationality, charges that Coleridge as an
advocate of philosophy has to take seriously, that Coleridge enunciates
his aesthetic statism. Coleridge seeks to reconcile the national political
traditions embodied in the English Constitution with the universality of
reason by positing a symbolic logic for this constitution.
Let us now turn to the speci cs of Paine s attack on the English
Constitution. The question of the relationship between theory, political
principles, and a written constitution had been brought to prominence
by Paine s charge in Rights of Man ( ) that the English government
had no constitution:
The aesthetic politics of Coleridge
A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but a
real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in visible form, there is
none . . . Can then Mr. Burke produce the English Constitution? If he cannot,
we may fairly conclude, that though it has been so much talked about, no such
thing as a constitution exists, or ever did exist, and consequently that the people
have yet a constitution to form.
For Paine, the French Revolution represented an advancement in
government in large part because its leaders had brought forth their
principles in a written form:
In contemplating the French constitution, we see in it a rational order of things.
The principles harmonize with the forms, and both with their origin. It may
perhaps be said as an excuse for bad forms, that they are nothing more than
forms; but this is a mistake. Forms grow out of principles, and operate to
continue the principles they grow from. It is impossible to practise a bad form
on anything but a bad principle. It cannot be ingrafted on a good one; and
wherever the forms in any government are bad, it is a certain indication that the
principles are bad also. Rights of Man,
As can be seen, Paine begins by asserting that the French constitution is
a rational order of things, and this indicates why an existing, nite,
visible, written form is required. Because Paine is very much a certain
kind of eighteenth-century thinker, he identi es rationality with a set of
rst principles which are clearly expressed and transparently inter-
preted. In the political application of reason, such a body of rst
principles is a written constitution.
When Paine states that the principles harmonize with the forms, he
sets up an important distinction between principles and forms. Of
these two terms, let us rst consider what Paine means by forms.
Elsewhere, in describing the in uence of the American Revolution in
making the French Revolution possible, Paine makes an analogy be-
tween the forms of the constitution and the forms of language: The
American constitutions were to liberty, what a grammar is to language:
they de ne its parts of speech, and practically construct them into
syntax (Rights of Man, ). Paine s remark that the American constitu-
tion is to liberty as grammar is to language makes it clear that the
forms are rst principles expressed in language, which, when applied to
political ends, yield the structure called the constitution.
In contrast, principles on their own, unembodied in language, are
intangible, having an ideal rather than real existence. In making
this distinction, Paine is operating with the usual eighteenth-century
theory of language, most famously adumbrated by Locke, which distin-
Romanticism, aesthetics, and nationalism
guishes between ideas in the mind and their expression in the marks and
sounds of language. Such a distinction carries with it the danger that the
connection between ideas and language, necessary for proper knowing
and doing, can be lost. And indeed much of this passage from Paine
plays out that anxiety. The importance of the harmony and inseparabil-
ity of forms and principles is insisted on repeatedly.
For Paine, it is the written constitution that takes on this cementing
role: it preserves the principles by binding them to written forms. And,
indeed, by the end of the passage, the ambiguity of the word forms
( whenever the forms in any government are bad ) makes it seem
that not only the written constitution is meant, but also all those
material manifestations of its enactment (the assembly, the law courts,
the army) as well. This seems to guarantee that the written document
will overcome any of the possible dangers that might slip in through
the gap between the idea and its representation, that is, between politi-
cal principles and their forms. Thus Paine believes that the only way to
ensure that a government is based on good principles is to base
them on reason and to insure those principles by setting them down in
a written form. From the written form of the constitution, the other
forms of government, its material institutions, will follow and be
safeguarded.
Because Paine considered the traditional political institutions of
Europe inequitable and thus irrational, he feared that, without the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]