[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
announced it was testing the sophisticated P-2 centrifuge.152 If successful, the use
of P-2 centrifuges would significantly enhance Iran s enrichment capability.
These developments once again put pressure on Russia to react. While a number
of Russian officials, such as Russia s Atomic Energy head Sergei Kiriyenko,
downplayed Iran s ability to create a nuclear bomb,153 and Foreign Minister Lavrov
called Iran s announcement a step in the wrong direction. 154 Moscow continued
to promote a diplomatic solution and oppose sanctions, with Lavrov asserting, We
are convinced that neither sanctions nor the use of force will lead to a solution of
this problem. 155
The United States patience with Russian policy on Iran, however, now appeared
to be running out. On 21 April US Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Burns called
for Russia to stop providing weapons to Iran and to end assistance to the Bushehr
nuclear project. These demands were immediately rejected by Russian officials
who stated the projects would go on unless the UN Security Council imposed
sanctions an unlikely possibility given Russian opposition to sanctions.156
When the IAEA report came out on 28 April 2006, it was highly critical of Iran.
The report made five central points:
1 During the 30-day period after the UN Security Council asked Iran to suspend
enrichment, Iran built a cascade of 164 centrifuges with an enrichment
capability of 3.6 percent.
2 Iran was building two additional cascades of 164 centrifuges each.
3 Iran refused to provide documents about the nuclear black market run by
Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 147
A.Q. Khan as they related to centrifuges and the building of the core of a
nuclear weapon.
4 Iran refused to answer questions about the experiments it was doing with
small amounts of plutonium.
5 Iran refused to explain the research it was doing on P-2 centrifuges.
The IAEA report concluded that because of these gaps in information including
the role of the military in Iran s nuclear program, the agency is unable to make
progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran. 157
Following the report, the US, and its European allies, pushed for sanctions
against Iran. And, as in the past, while calling for Iran to provide the necessary
information to the IAEA, Russia continued to resist sanctions while also opposing
any kind of military action against Iran. Russia s new UN representative, Vitaly
Churkin, made this point clearly following a debate on policy toward Iran at the UN
Security Council several days after the IAEA report, stating, We are convinced
that there is no military solution to the problem. However, complicated and difficult
it may be, a political and diplomatic solution of the problem needs to be sought. 158
Meanwhile, in an effort to persuade Russia not to support the sanctions resolution,
Iran dangled a major economic incentive the chance to be the preferred bidder on
two additional nuclear reactors,159 a development that would not only earn Russia
valuable hard currency, but would also fit nicely into Putin s high-tech economic
program.
In any case, the IAEA report of 28 April 2006 and the Russian reaction to it,
demonstrates that Moscow has definitely chosen to preserve its ties with Iran at
the expense of its relationship with the United States and its NATO allies. Such
behavior makes a genuine partnership with NATO appear to be impossible.
Russia s relations with Syria
After a long period of coolness dating back to the closing years of the Soviet
Union, Russian Syrian relations sharply improved in 2005. This happened just as
Syria was growing increasingly isolated first because of its heavy-handed policies
in Lebanon Syria had forced a 2004 change in the Lebanese constitution to
allow a three-year extension to the term of Lebanon s pro-Syrian president, Emile
Lahoud and then because of Syria s purported involvement in the February 2005
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri.
On 2 September 2004, when the UN Security Council approved UN Resolution
1559 which called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from
Lebanon and for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias, Russia abstained choosing not to veto the resolution even
though it was clearly aimed at Syria and its ally in Lebanon, the Hezbollah
militia.160 However, following the passage of Resolution 1559, Russian policy
changed. As mentioned above, in late 2004 Putin suffered a series of reversals
because of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Chechen terrorist attack on
148 R.O. Freedman
the school in Beslan, which demonstrated the incompetence of Putin s security
forces. Putin sought to compensate for these events by playing a more active role
in the Middle East so as to demonstrate Russia was still a great power. Thus, as
noted above, he finally signed the nuclear fuel agreement with Iran in February
2005 and moved to sharply improve relations with Syria.
Syria was a target of opportunity for Russia as it sought to rebuild its position
in the Middle East. By the beginning of 2005 Syria was under heavy pressure
on two fronts. Not only had the UN Security Council condemned its activities
in Lebanon but the US was complaining that Syria had become a conduit for
foreign Jihadists fighting in Iraq. Consequently, when Moscow, during Bashar
Assad s visit to Moscow in January 2005, agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria s
$13.4 billion debt to Russia, Putin demonstrated strong support for an increasingly
isolated Syrian government.161 Then, in March 2005 Russia and Syria signed an
agreement for Russia to develop new oil and gas deposits in Syria162 and in April,
just before Putin arrived in Israel, Russia signed an agreement to provide surface-
to-air missiles to Syria163 a further sign of support for Syria which was under
increasing pressure because of the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Indeed under
heavy international pressure, spearheaded by France and the United States, Syria
was compelled to pull its troops out of Lebanon by the end of April, with Russia
choosing once again not to interfere in the face of NATO solidarity on the issue.164
Then, the special commission investigating the assassination of Hariri, under the
leadership of the German police officer Detlev Mehlis, issued an interim report in
October 2005 implicating high-ranking members of the Syrian government, and
noting that the Syrian regime had obstructed cooperation with the commission.
At the same time, a committee under Terje Rød-Larsen issued a report to the UN
that stated that Syria, despite pulling its forces out of Lebanon, had continued to
supply Lebanese and Palestinian militias in Lebanon with weaponry.165 Upon the
release of the two reports, the US, Britain and France, acting jointly, called for
UN sanctions against Syria. As in the case of Iran, Moscow sought to prevent the
sanctions and succeeded in somewhat watering down the UN Security Council
Resolution criticizing Syria. Nonetheless, UN Security Council Resolution 1636
did condemn Syria for trying to mislead the Mehlis Commission by following a
policy of cooperating in form but not in substance, and demanded Syria expand
its cooperation with the investigation or face further action. 166 While Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov praised UN Security Council Resolution 1636 for taking
Russia s views into account,167 and did manage to prevent an immediate referral of
Syria to the UN Security Council, as in the case of Iran, Moscow may face some [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl aikidobyd.xlx.pl
announced it was testing the sophisticated P-2 centrifuge.152 If successful, the use
of P-2 centrifuges would significantly enhance Iran s enrichment capability.
These developments once again put pressure on Russia to react. While a number
of Russian officials, such as Russia s Atomic Energy head Sergei Kiriyenko,
downplayed Iran s ability to create a nuclear bomb,153 and Foreign Minister Lavrov
called Iran s announcement a step in the wrong direction. 154 Moscow continued
to promote a diplomatic solution and oppose sanctions, with Lavrov asserting, We
are convinced that neither sanctions nor the use of force will lead to a solution of
this problem. 155
The United States patience with Russian policy on Iran, however, now appeared
to be running out. On 21 April US Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Burns called
for Russia to stop providing weapons to Iran and to end assistance to the Bushehr
nuclear project. These demands were immediately rejected by Russian officials
who stated the projects would go on unless the UN Security Council imposed
sanctions an unlikely possibility given Russian opposition to sanctions.156
When the IAEA report came out on 28 April 2006, it was highly critical of Iran.
The report made five central points:
1 During the 30-day period after the UN Security Council asked Iran to suspend
enrichment, Iran built a cascade of 164 centrifuges with an enrichment
capability of 3.6 percent.
2 Iran was building two additional cascades of 164 centrifuges each.
3 Iran refused to provide documents about the nuclear black market run by
Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 147
A.Q. Khan as they related to centrifuges and the building of the core of a
nuclear weapon.
4 Iran refused to answer questions about the experiments it was doing with
small amounts of plutonium.
5 Iran refused to explain the research it was doing on P-2 centrifuges.
The IAEA report concluded that because of these gaps in information including
the role of the military in Iran s nuclear program, the agency is unable to make
progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran. 157
Following the report, the US, and its European allies, pushed for sanctions
against Iran. And, as in the past, while calling for Iran to provide the necessary
information to the IAEA, Russia continued to resist sanctions while also opposing
any kind of military action against Iran. Russia s new UN representative, Vitaly
Churkin, made this point clearly following a debate on policy toward Iran at the UN
Security Council several days after the IAEA report, stating, We are convinced
that there is no military solution to the problem. However, complicated and difficult
it may be, a political and diplomatic solution of the problem needs to be sought. 158
Meanwhile, in an effort to persuade Russia not to support the sanctions resolution,
Iran dangled a major economic incentive the chance to be the preferred bidder on
two additional nuclear reactors,159 a development that would not only earn Russia
valuable hard currency, but would also fit nicely into Putin s high-tech economic
program.
In any case, the IAEA report of 28 April 2006 and the Russian reaction to it,
demonstrates that Moscow has definitely chosen to preserve its ties with Iran at
the expense of its relationship with the United States and its NATO allies. Such
behavior makes a genuine partnership with NATO appear to be impossible.
Russia s relations with Syria
After a long period of coolness dating back to the closing years of the Soviet
Union, Russian Syrian relations sharply improved in 2005. This happened just as
Syria was growing increasingly isolated first because of its heavy-handed policies
in Lebanon Syria had forced a 2004 change in the Lebanese constitution to
allow a three-year extension to the term of Lebanon s pro-Syrian president, Emile
Lahoud and then because of Syria s purported involvement in the February 2005
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri.
On 2 September 2004, when the UN Security Council approved UN Resolution
1559 which called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from
Lebanon and for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias, Russia abstained choosing not to veto the resolution even
though it was clearly aimed at Syria and its ally in Lebanon, the Hezbollah
militia.160 However, following the passage of Resolution 1559, Russian policy
changed. As mentioned above, in late 2004 Putin suffered a series of reversals
because of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Chechen terrorist attack on
148 R.O. Freedman
the school in Beslan, which demonstrated the incompetence of Putin s security
forces. Putin sought to compensate for these events by playing a more active role
in the Middle East so as to demonstrate Russia was still a great power. Thus, as
noted above, he finally signed the nuclear fuel agreement with Iran in February
2005 and moved to sharply improve relations with Syria.
Syria was a target of opportunity for Russia as it sought to rebuild its position
in the Middle East. By the beginning of 2005 Syria was under heavy pressure
on two fronts. Not only had the UN Security Council condemned its activities
in Lebanon but the US was complaining that Syria had become a conduit for
foreign Jihadists fighting in Iraq. Consequently, when Moscow, during Bashar
Assad s visit to Moscow in January 2005, agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria s
$13.4 billion debt to Russia, Putin demonstrated strong support for an increasingly
isolated Syrian government.161 Then, in March 2005 Russia and Syria signed an
agreement for Russia to develop new oil and gas deposits in Syria162 and in April,
just before Putin arrived in Israel, Russia signed an agreement to provide surface-
to-air missiles to Syria163 a further sign of support for Syria which was under
increasing pressure because of the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Indeed under
heavy international pressure, spearheaded by France and the United States, Syria
was compelled to pull its troops out of Lebanon by the end of April, with Russia
choosing once again not to interfere in the face of NATO solidarity on the issue.164
Then, the special commission investigating the assassination of Hariri, under the
leadership of the German police officer Detlev Mehlis, issued an interim report in
October 2005 implicating high-ranking members of the Syrian government, and
noting that the Syrian regime had obstructed cooperation with the commission.
At the same time, a committee under Terje Rød-Larsen issued a report to the UN
that stated that Syria, despite pulling its forces out of Lebanon, had continued to
supply Lebanese and Palestinian militias in Lebanon with weaponry.165 Upon the
release of the two reports, the US, Britain and France, acting jointly, called for
UN sanctions against Syria. As in the case of Iran, Moscow sought to prevent the
sanctions and succeeded in somewhat watering down the UN Security Council
Resolution criticizing Syria. Nonetheless, UN Security Council Resolution 1636
did condemn Syria for trying to mislead the Mehlis Commission by following a
policy of cooperating in form but not in substance, and demanded Syria expand
its cooperation with the investigation or face further action. 166 While Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov praised UN Security Council Resolution 1636 for taking
Russia s views into account,167 and did manage to prevent an immediate referral of
Syria to the UN Security Council, as in the case of Iran, Moscow may face some [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]